Understand custody · Editorial overview
The Data Leaked, the Keys Did Not. Who Controls Your BTC?
Private keys were not stolen in either case. Yet both incidents show that Bitcoin security does not end with a seed phrase. Names, addresses, identity documents, transaction histories, and trusted support staff still surround the keys.
EDITORIAL OVERVIEW · Prepared by the project editors from the sources listed below.
Trezor: the wallet remained secure, the identity did not
In August 2026, Trezor disclosed a breach at a shipping provider. It affected customers in the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Colombia, Brazil, Italy, and Portugal whose orders had shipped during the 90 days before August 8.
According to the company, 11,742 customers had their name, email address, phone number, and shipping address exposed. Another 1,947 had their name, city, and email address exposed. Trezor systems, devices, and wallet backups were not compromised, so owners retained their private keys.
Still, connecting a person and home address to a hardware-wallet purchase creates its own risk. Targeted phishing, social engineering, and physical coercion can all become more convincing.
Coinbase: no keys were stolen, but the attackers knew enough
In May 2025, Coinbase received a ransom demand. The company said the threat actor had paid several employees and contractors in overseas support roles to collect customer information.
Passwords and private keys were not compromised, and support staff had no direct access to funds. The exposed data nevertheless included names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, identity-document images, masked bank and Social Security details, balance snapshots, and transaction histories.
Coinbase dismissed the people involved, refused to pay the ransom, worked with law enforcement, and said it would reimburse eligible customers deceived through attacks that used the stolen data.
Two incidents, two kinds of control
A hardware-wallet buyer normally controls the keys. A leaked order record is dangerous, but it does not let the manufacturer or shipping company sign a transaction. On a custodial exchange, the customer sees an account balance while the operator controls the keys and the withdrawal process.
BTC may be legally recorded for a customer, but until withdrawal to a self-controlled address, the customer technically holds a claim on an intermediary. The distinction matters during document reviews, access restrictions, and outages.
The Living Archive's view
“Not your keys, not your coins” is true but incomplete. Self-custody restores signing authority and also makes the owner responsible for seed storage, backups, inheritance, and physical security.
An exchange can make account recovery easier, but it can delay a withdrawal, request documents, or restrict access. It also stores the connection between identity and financial activity. The useful question is not only which option is easier, but who receives control and what price is paid for that convenience.
Bitcoin makes self-custody possible. Use that option deliberately: minimize the personal data you expose, plan recovery in advance, and do not confuse control of an account with control of a key.
A key determines who can move BTC. Personal data determines whom an attacker may try to pressure into doing it.
Sources and verification
This article does not claim that a hardware wallet removes every risk or that exchange custody must lead to a loss. It compares two models of control and responsibility.
Unless stated otherwise, the text, conclusions, structure and editorial arrangement were created by the project editors. Facts, quotations and source materials remain attributable to their authors and rights holders.
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